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PROVISIONS DENYING A DEDUCTION FOR ILLEGAL EXPENSES AND
EXPENSES OF AN ILLEGAL BUSINESS SHOULD BE REPEALED

by
Douglas A. Kahn*
Howard Bromberg**
ABSTRACT

The federal income tax law denies a deduction for
illegal expenses, for any expense (legal or otherwise) of an
illegal business that is traf
f icking in controlled substances, for
losses incurred in an unlawful activity, and for bribes,
kickbacks, and rebates connected with the Medicare or
Medicaid progra_m. In this Article, the authors first describe
the current treatment of those items by the tax law. The Article
next explains that the current treatment constitutes a penalty
for the taxpayer whose deduction is denied, and then explores
why such a penalty is bad policy and conflicts with the
traditional purposes and goals of punishing wrongful
behavior. The principal objection to the penalty imposed by
the tax law's denial of deductions for business and profit
oriented expenses is that the manner in which the size of
the tax law's penalty is determined is completely arbitrary
and bears no relationship to the seriousness of the crime or
the conditions under which it was committed. Another
objection to the penalty is that it would be litigated in a
civil tax suit in which the taxpayer would lack the protections
and rights accorded to criminal defendants even though it
constitutes a punishment for criminal behavior. The penalty
is especially harsh as applied to the legal expenses of a
*
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of a deduction could be justified as a type of sin tax.
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marijuana business under a more stringent Code provision
given the decriminalization of marijuana by many states. The
Article also contends that the denial of a deduction for
unlawful medical expenses conflicts with the principle
allowing the patient a deduction for whatever treatment the
patient chooses so long as it is based on a bona fide effort to
deal with the illness. The authors recommend that Congress
act to eliminate all ofthese tax penalties.
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INTRODUCTION

Currently, the tax law denies a deduction for business expenses that
violate a federal or state law (but only if the state law is generally enforced).
In addition, losses, including business losses, cannot be deducted if they arise
out of an illegal activity. For example, medical expenses are denied a
deduction if they are illegal. Kickbacks, bribes, and rebates given in
connection with the Medicaid or Medicare program are nondeductible. Any
expenses, legal or not, incurred in connection with the conduct of a business
of selling a controlled substance that is prohibited by federal law (or by the
law of the state in which the business is conducted) cannot be deducted.
It is the contention of the authors that all of those provisions should be
repealed and that there should be no restriction on the deductibility of an
expense because of its illegality or its connection with an illegal activity. The
authors will show in this Article that the current treatment is bad policy and
not in accord with the traditional rationale for meting out punishment.
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Part II of this Article describes the current tax treatment of illegal
expenses and illegal businesses. Part Ill sets forth the reasons for the authors'
contention that those provisions are inappropriate. Part IV sets forth the
authors' conclusions.
II.

CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF ILLEGAL EXPENSES AND
BUSINESSES

Prior to 1969, the principal basis for denying a deduction for illegal
expenses was the common law doctrine that no deduction is allowable if it
would frustrate public policy. 1 The Court's denial of a deduction was not
grounded on the construction of a Code provision, such as the requirement that
an expenditure be an ordinary and necessary business expense to be
deductible. Rather, even if the expense was an ordinary and necessary business
expense, a deduction was disallowed if its allowance would frustrate a sharply
defined public policy. 2 For the doctrine to apply, the national or state policy
that would be frustrated must have been evidenced by a governmental
declaration and not merely by the mores of the community. 3 In Tank Truck
Rentals v. Commissioner,4 the Supreme Court stated that it is not sufficient to
deny a deduction where the expenditure incidentally impacts a governmental
policy; the courts must weigh the degree of severity of frustration that the
allowance of a deduction would cause. The Court further stated that if the
expenditure in question is illegal under a state law, "the frustration of state
policy is most complete and direct."5 Despite this broad language, in a
companion case that was decided the same day as Tank Truck Rentals,
Commissioner v. Sullivan,6 the Supreme Court allowed a deduction for rent
paid by an Illinois bookmaker even though the payment of that rent for the use
of a bookmaking establishment was itself illegal under Illinois statutory law.
The Sullivan decision was overturned by legislation adopted in 1969 and is
discussed below.
1.
See, e.g. , Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) ("The
Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the federal courts have
from time to time, however, narrowed the generally accepted meaning of the language
used in [s]ection 23(a) in order that tax deduction consequences might not frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct.").
2.
Id.
See Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952). Despite that
3.
limitation, some courts appear to have denied a deduction because of a distaste for
what was done even if no governmental mandate was violated. See, e.g. , United
Draperies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964) (disallowing a
deduction for a lawful kickback).
356 U.S. 30, 35 ( 1958).
4.
Id.
5.
6.
356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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A major change took place in 1969 when Congress adopted the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, 7 in which Congress amended section 162(c) of the Code.
As amended, 8 section 162(c) denies a deduction for the following
expenditures:
Section 162(c)(1) denies a deduction for an illegal payment made
directly or indirectly to a government official or employee if the payment is a
bribe or kickback, or if the payment is made to an official or employee of a
foreign government if the payment is illegal under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977. 9
Section 162(c)(2) denies a deduction for any payment (other than one
covered by section 162(c)(l )) that "constitutes an illegal bribe, an illegal
kickback, or other illegal payment under any law of the United States, or any
law of a State" if that state law is generally enforced.
Section 162(c)(3) denies a deduction for bribes, rebates, and
kickbacks made in connection with the conduct of Medicare or Medicaid
programs. This provision does not require that the bribe, rebate or kickback be
illegal.
The Senate Report to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 stated that those
amendments replace the common law frustration of public policy doctrine and
are exclusive. 10 In other words, after 1969, there is no denial of a deduction
for business expenses on common law public policy grounds. Consistent with
that legislative history, regulations explicitly provide that "[a] deduction for
an expense paid or incurred after December 30, 1969, which would otherwise
be allowable under section 162 shall not be denied on the grounds that
allowance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public
policy."11
In addition to adding section 162(c), the Tax Reform Act of 1969 also
added section 162(f) to the Code, which denies a deduction for a fine or similar
penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law. 12 That provision
essentially codifies the holding of Tank Truck Rentals. 1 3
The common law doctrine denying a deduction for frustration of
public policy applied to expenditures that otherwise would have been
deductible. 14 The amount paid to purchase an item to be resold is not
P. L. No. 91-172, § 902(b:r(c), 83 Stat. 487, 710 (1969).
7.
Subsequent amendments to section 162(c) were made in 1971, 1976,
8.
and 1982. The statement in the following text above of the substance of section 162(c)
is the current version of that provision and reflects those subsequent amendments.
9.
Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
10. s. REP. No. 91-552, at 274 (1969).
11. Reg. § 1.162-l(a).
12. The 1969 Act also added section 162(g) denying a deduction for two
thirds of treble damages awarded in an antitrust case in certain circumstances.
13. See supra text accompanying note 4.
14. See, e.g., Heininger, 320 U.S. at 468.
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deductible; instead, the cost is included in the item's basis (or included in the
taxpayer's cost of goods sold for his inventory) and offsets the amount realized
on its sale in determining the amount of gain realized.1 5 The question arose as
to whether an illegal expenditure to purchase an item could be included in the
cost of the item when it was sold and thereby offset revenue received from that
sale. In a 1948 decision, a majority of the Tax Court held in Sullenger v.
Commissioner16 that an amount paid to purchase meat that was subsequently
resold was included in the taxpayer's cost of goods sold even though part of
the amount paid for the meat violated a federal law. The meat was purchased
at a time when the price of goods was subject to controls established by an
agency of the government (the OPA). The taxpayer paid an amount for meat
that was greater than the permitted price. The government contended that the
amount paid in excess of the permitted figure could not be included in the cost
of the meat when the taxpayer sold it. The majority of the Tax Court (only one
judge dissented) held that the entire amount paid for the meat, including the
portion that was in excess of the permitted figure, is included in the taxpayer's
cost of goods sold. The IRS initially acquiesced in that decision, 17 but
subsequently
withdrew
that
acquiescence
and
substituted
a
nonacquiescence. 18 Consistent with that nonacquiescence, the Treasury later
promulgated a regulation stating that illegal expenditures are not included in
the cost of goods sold. 19
By its terms, the denial of a deduction for illegal business expenses in
section 162(c)(2) applies only to expenses that otherwise would be deductible
as business expenses. 2° Capital expenditures are not deductible as business
expenses. 21 However, Regulation section 1.47 l-3(f) provides that the cost of
goods sold does not include an item which is of a type that would be disallowed
as a deduction under section 162(c), (f), or (g) and the regulations thereunder
in the case of a business expense. 22 In essence, the regulation has expanded
the statutory reach of section 162(c) to capital expenditures. Consequently, a
capital expenditure that is made in violation of a state or federal law is not
added to an item's basis and so the recovery of that expenditure on a sale of
the item will be taxed.
While section 162(c) is the exclusive source of denying a deduction
for an illegal business expense, to what extent can the frustration of public
15. I.R.C. § 263A(a)( l)(A), (b)(2).
16. 11 T.C. 1076 (1948), nonacq. 1976-2 C.B. 4.
17. 1952-2 C.B. 3.
18. 1976-2 C.B. 4.
19. Reg.§ l . 471-3(f).
20. l . R.C. § 162(c)(2) ("No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a)
[of this Code section] . . . . ).
21. See I.R.C. § 263.
22. Reg. l. 471-3(f).
"
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policy doctrine be applied to deny a deduction that is otherwise allowable
under a Code provision other than section 162? For example, most allowed
losses (including business losses) are deductible under section 165.23 Can the
frustration of public policy doctrine be applied to a loss otherwise deductible
under section 165? In Revenue Ruling 77-126,24 the Commissioner ruled that
the frustration of public policy doctrine does indeed apply to losses under
section 165. The courts have also followed that view. 25 In Holmes Enterprises,
Inc. v. Commissioner,26 the sole shareholder and president of the taxpayer (a
corporation) was caught carrying marijuana in an automobile owned by the
corporation. The automobile was seized by the United States and forfeited to
it. Although the automobile was used by the corporation for business purposes,
the Tax Court denied the corporation a deduction for the forfeiture under
section 165 because the deduction would frustrate a sharply defined national
policy against the possession and sale of marijuana. 27 Additionally, in
Stephens v. Commissioner,28 both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit agreed
that the frustration of public policy doctrine does apply to deductions claimed
under section 165, although they disagreed as to how that policy is to be
construed.
While section 162(f) denies a deduction for a fine or penalty paid to a
government for a violation of a law, that provision would not have been
applicable in the Holmes case. Section 162(f) applies only to prevent a
deduction under sections 162 and 212; it does not apply to losses under section
165.29 Although section 162(f) would not directly apply to the forfeiture in
Holmes, the principle underlying that provision could be used as a public
policy ground for denying a deduction. Courts have held that the common law
principle of denying a deduction for an item when the deduction would

23. See, e.g. , Holt v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 75, 78 (1977), ajf'd per
curiam, 611 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We think that the items involved are properly
characterized as loss items and would be deductible, ifat all, under section 165.").
24. 1977-1 C.B. 47. In that ruling, the taxpayer failed to pay federal taxes
that were due on gambling devices that the taxpayer owned and operated. The failure
to pay those taxes made the taxpayer's use of the equipment illegal. The federal
government seized the devices, and they were forfeited to the government. The
Commissioner ruled that the frustration of public policy doctrine prevented the
taxpayer from obtaining a deduction under section 165 for the loss of the equipment.
See also, Rev. Rul. 81-24, 1981-1 C.B. 79.
25. See, e.g. , Holt, 69 T.C. at 78.
26. 69 T.C. 114 (1977).
27. Since the public policy ground for denying a deduction applies to
section 165, the court might have characterized the forfeiture as a fine and held that it
would contravene public policy to allow a deduction for a fine.
28. 93 T.C. 108 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990).
29. l.R.C. § 162(f) ("No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) [of
this Code section] . . . . ").
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frustrate public policy applies to deductions claimed under section 165. 30 In
Tank Truck Rentals, which was decided prior to the adoption of section 162(f),
the Supreme Court held that no deduction is allowed for the payment of a fine
because it would contravene public policy to allow the deduction. If the court
in Holmes had treated the forfeiture as a fine that would just have been another
avenue to apply the public policy doctrine.
Section 212 permits a deduction for expenses incurred in producing or
collecting income, expenses incurred to manage, conserve, or maintain
property that is held for the production of income, and expenses incurred in
the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.31 Section 212 applies to the
same type of expenses as are covered by the business expense deduction of
section 162 except that the section 212 expenses are not incurred in the conduct
of a trade or business. Consequently, section 212 is said to be in pari materia
with section 162. In that regard, Regulation section 1.212-l (p) states that an
expense otherwise allowable under section 212 will be disallowed if the
expenditure is of a type for which a deduction would be disallowed under
section 162(c), (f), or (g) and the regulations thereunder in the case of a
business expense. In light of the connection between sections 162 and 212 and
the fact that the statutory denial of a deduction for illegal expenditures is
applied to section 212, it seems virtually certain that the common law
frustration of public policy doctrine does not apply to section 212.
An interesting illustration of how far the courts have gone in applying
the frustration of public policy doctrine is Mazzei v. Commissioner. 32 In that
case, the taxpayer was induced to give $20,000 cash to several persons to put
the bills through a box that he believed would create duplicate bills. Instead,
they stole the taxpayer's money. A majority of the Tax Court denied the
taxpayer's claim for a theft loss deduction on the ground that it is against
public policy to grant a deduction for a loss suffered by a person engaged in a
counterfeiting scheme. Five judges dissented because they felt that the
deduction would not frustrate public policy as the doctrine was defined in Tank
Truck Rentals.
Generally, subject to a floor, 33 medical expenses are allowable as
itemized deductions. 34 According to the regulations, however, medical
expenditures are not deductible if they violate a federal or state law.35
30.
31.
32.

See e.g. , Stephens, 93 T.C. at 111-112.
l.R.C. § 212(1)-(3)
61 T.C. 497 (1974). See also Richey

v.

Commissioner, 33 T.C. 272

(1959).
33. Generally, only the amount of medical expenses that exceeds 10 percent
of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income is deductible. 1.R.C. § 2 13(a). For years prior
to 20 17, the floor for certain elderly taxpayers is 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.
1.R.C. § 213(t).
34. l.R.C. § 213.
35. See Reg. § 1.213-l (e)(l )(ii), (e)(2).

214

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 18:5

Amounts paid for an operation that is illegal are not deductible. 36 While
medicine and drugs typically are deductible as medical expenses, the
regulations provide that the deduction applies only to items that are legally
procured. 37
In the absence of a statutory denial, the legal expenses of an illegal
business are deductible. 3 8 In the 1981 Tax Court decision of Edmondson v.
Commissioner,39 the question arose whether the denial of a deduction for
illegal expenses in section 162(c)(2) prevents the deduction of the legal
expenses of a business that was illegal to operate. Edmondson involved a
taxpayer who was in the illegal business of selling amphetamines, cocaine, and
marijuana. The Tax Court held that the legal expenses incurred in conducting
that illegal business are deductible under section 162(a). Such expenses were
held to be ordinary and necessary.
Congress was displeased with that decision and responded by adding
section 280E to the Code. Section 280E disallows a deduction or credit for any
expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business if that business
consists of trafficking in controlled substances listed in Schedule I or II of the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA),40 if that business is prohibited by
federal law or by the law of a state in which the business is conducted. 41
Marijuana is included in Schedule I of the CSA, and the conduct of dispensing,
manufacturing or distributing marijuana violates federal law even if it is
permitted by state law. So, section 280E disallows a deduction or credit for the
business expenses of a business manufacturing or selling marijuana even when
that business is lawful under the law of the state in which it operates. 42 The
quotation below from the report of the Senate Finance Committee on this
provision illustrates why Congress adopted it:
There is a sharply defined public policy against drug dealing.
To allow drug dealers the benefit of business expense
deductions at the same time that the U.S. and its citizens are
losing billions of dollars per year to such persons is not
compelled by the fact that such deductions are allowed to

36. Reg. § 1.2 13-l(e)(l )(ii).
37. Reg. § l .2 13-l(e)(2).
38. See Accardo v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1991).
39. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1533, 1974 T.C.M. (RIA) if 8 1,623.
40. Pub. L. No. 9 1-513, § 202 84 Stat. 1236, 1247-50 (1970). Among the
five schedules of drug classifications under the CSA, Schedule I lists the most
dangerous drugs, with no ascribed medical benefit, followed by the other schedules in
descending order.
4 1. I.R.C. § 280E.
42. See, e.g. , Californians Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 128 T.C. 173 (2007); Olive v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 19 (2012).
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other legal enterprises. Such deductions should be disallowed
on public policy grounds. 43
In disallowing a deduction or credit for the legal expenses of drug
businesses, Congress made no distinction between those businesses that are
operating legally under state law and those that are not. So long as the drug in
which they are trafficking is a controlled substance prohibited under either
Schedule I or II, it will be an illegal business under federal law and its expenses
will be disallowed. The statutory requirement of "trafficking" has not proved
to limit the reach of the statute. It has been held to mean no more than to be
engaged in commercial activity with that drug such as marketing it. 44
Since section 280E denies deductions and credits, it would not seem
to cover capital expenditures which are added to basis and are not deductible.
However, as noted above, the denial of deductions for illegal expenses of
section 162(c)(2) has been expanded by regulation to capital expenditures. 45
One might have expected that section 280E would be given similarly
expansive treatment. To the contrary, because of a concern over constitutional
validity, the Senate Finance Report states unequivocally that the provision
does not apply to the cost of goods sold. Specifically, the report reads:

All deductions and credits for amounts paid or incurred in the
illegal trafficking of drugs listed in the Controlled Substances
Act are disallowed. To preclude possible challenges on
constitutional grounds, the adjustment to gross receipts with
respect to effective costs of goods sold is not affected by this
provision of the bill. 46
As a consequence of excluding cost of goods sold from the reach of
the statute, there is an incentive for taxpayers engaged in the covered drug
businesses to classify as much of their lawful expenditures as capital
expenditures (as contrasted to ordinary business expenses) as they possibly
can validate. This circumstance is the opposite of what usually exists.
43. S. REP. No. 97-494, vol. l , at 309 (1982). Note that while the lawful
capital expenditures of a covered drug business are included in cost of goods sold,
their unlawful capital expenditures are excluded from cost of goods sold because of
the extension of section 162(c)(2) to capital expenditures by Regulation section l.4713(t).
44. See, e.g. , Californians Helping, 128 T.C. at 182 (defining "trafficking"
under the Code as including supplying of medical marijuana); Olive, 139 T.C. at 38
(holding that a California medical marijuana dispensary's dispensing of medical
marijuana pursuant to California law was "trafficking" within the meaning of section
280E.).
45. Reg.§ 1.471-3(t).
46. S. REP. No. 97-494, vol. l , at 309.
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Typically, taxpayers seek to maximize the amount of their expenditures that
can be treated as business expenses, but not in this case. The IRS has provided
guidance for determining which expenditures can be capitalized and the
method of accounting for inventory for the purposes of section 280E. 4 7 The
problem of making that determination is discussed in a recent article by Debra
Sanders and Susan Gill. 48
The problems that section 280E poses for businesses conducting a
marijuana operation in a state where it is legal are daunting. There is a growing
trend to legalize marijuana at least for some purposes. Currently, 23 states plus
the District of Columbia allow the use of marijuana for medical purposes. In
four of those states plus the District of Columbia, recreational use of marijuana
is also legal. 49 It is widely expected that more states will decriminalize
marijuana as a result of state ballot initiatives in the 2 0 1 6 elections. 50 The
denial of a deduction for the ordinary expenses of conducting a marijuana
business makes those businesses taxable on their gross income, and that can
make it extremely difficult for them to break even after payment of federal
taxes. 51
Ill.

REASONS FOR REPEAL

The income tax is a tax on net income. 52 For that reason, business
expenses are deductible. The denial of a deduction for an illegal expense
incurred in producing income means that that taxpayer is being taxed on gross
4 7. C.C.A. 2015-04-011 (Jan. 23, 2015). Note that while the lawful capital
expenditures of a covered drug business are included in cost of goods sold, their
unlawful capital expenditures are excluded from cost of goods sold because of the
extension of section 162(c)(2) to capital expenditures by Regulation section 1.47 l 3(f).
48. Debra Sanders & Susan Gill, Guidance on Inventory Methods for
Medical and Recreational Marijuana Businesses, 122 J. TAX'N 218 (2015).
49. Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin,
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77, 85-89
(2015) [hereinafter Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism]. Delaware
decriminalizes private use of marijuana under a law that takes effect on December 18,
2015. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana
laws.aspx (an updated, online survey of state law).
50. See, e.g. , BRUCE BARCOTT, WEED THE PEOPLE: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
MARIJUANA IN AMERICA 313-14 (2015) [hereinafter BARCOTI, WEED THE PEOPLE].
51. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Marijuana Merchants Face Another Federal
Obstacle: High Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (N.Y. ed.), May 10, 2015, at A l 7 (citing among
other examples, the Northwest Patient Resource Center, a Seattle marijuana
dispensary, which in 2014 earned $53,369 in profits, but because of prohibited
deductions, owed $46,340 in federal taxes).
52. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).
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income instead of net income. The denial of the deduction constitutes a penalty
for the taxpayer's wrongdoing. As the Supreme Court stated in the Tellier
decision:
We start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a
tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing. That
principle has been firmly imbedded in the tax statute from the
beginning. One familiar facet of the principle is the truism that
the statute does not concern itself with the lawfulness of the
income that it taxes. Income from a criminal enterprise is
taxed at a rate no higher and no lower than income from more
conventional sources. "[T]he fact that a business is unlawful
(does not) exempt it from paying the taxes that if lawful it
would have to pay."53
The Revenue Act of 191354 was the first tax law enacted after the
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment. As noted in the Tellier opinion, several
amendments were proposed to the bill that became the 1913 Act that would
have denied a deduction for the losses of an illegal business. Those
amendments were rejected. In the words of Senator Williams on the Senate
floor:
The object of this bill is to tax a man's net income, that is to
say, what he has at the end of the year after deducting from
his receipts his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform
men's moral characters, that is not the object of the bill at all.
The tax is not levied for the purpose of restraining people from
betting on horse races or upon futures, but the tax is framed
for the purpose of making the man pay upon his net income
his actual profit during the year. The law does not care where
he got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although the law
may very properly care in another way. 55
Concededly, the tax law has moved away from the sentiments
expressed above and now does tax illegal activities differently from lawful
ones. An examination of the merits of the current treatment shows that it is ill
advised. Before describing why this treatment is bad policy, let us first explore
whether the denial of a deduction constitutes a penalty.
A basic principle of income taxation is the concept of equity
horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity dictates that persons
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(A)( l ), 38 Stat. 114, 166.
Tellier, 383 U.S. at 69 1 (quoting 50 CONG. REC. 3,849 (1913)).
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having the same income should pay the same tax, and vertical equity dictates
that persons having disparate incomes should pay a different tax that bears a
reasonable relationship to the disparity in their incomes. One problem with
applying the equity principle is that it requires a determination of what
constitutes equal or unequal incomes. The income in question is net income,
not gross receipts or gross income, and so the thorny issue of what items are
properly taken into account in determining net income is not resolved by those
principles. But the one item that clearly should be taken into account is the
expense incurred in producing the income. If taxation were based on gross
income instead of on net income, there would be a higher tax on businesses
with high costs than on those with low costs. Consider the following
illustration:
X operates a business which produced gross revenue of $1 ,000,000 in
Year One. To produce that revenue, X incurred $300,000 in expenses, and so
he netted a profit of $700,000. Y operated a business that also produced gross
revenue of $ 1 ,000,000 in Year One. However, Y incurred expenses of
$800,000 to produce that revenue and so netted a profit of only $200,000. If
no deduction were allowed for the expenses incurred by the two businesses,
they would each pay a tax on $ 1 ,000,000 and each would pay the same amount
of tax as the other. Under any reasonable standard, X and Y are not in the same
income position or have the same ability to pay taxes. Perhaps the reason that
Y's expenses are so much greater than X's is that the nature of Y's business
requires greater expenditures or perhaps X is just more efficient than Y.
Regardless of the reason, those two should not be paying the same amount of
tax, and the allowance of a deduction for business expenses prevents that from
occurring. Instead, X will pay tax on $700,000 and Y will pay tax on $200,000.
If, in the illustration above Y's expenses were unlawful, Y would not
be permitted to deduct them and Y would be taxed on income of $ 1 ,000,000.
Although Y has $500,000 less profit than X, Y will pay a much larger tax than
X. Clearly, the tax law is punishing Y. Since Y's actions are illegal,
presumably some governmental entity will punish her for her behavior. In
addition to whatever punishment is meted out to Y for her unlawful behavior,
the federal government will add to that penalty by overtaxing her.
Not only does the current tax law deny a deduction for illegal
expenses, 56 it also precludes an illegal expenditure made to purchase an item
from being included in the item's basis. 57 So, on a sale of the item, the taxpayer
is taxed on the entire amount that she receives including the amount that
represents a recovery of her cost of purchase. This means that the taxpayer is
taxed on her gross receipts; she is not even allowed to limit her recognition to
her gross income.

56. See supra Part IL
57. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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The fact that the denial of a deduction for illegal expenses (and a
denial of basis for an illegal purchase) is a penalty does not by itself mean that
it is bad policy. Y is a wrongdoer. What is wrong with the federal government
adding to the sanctions imposed on her by increasing her tax burden? Let us
now turn to that question in the context of the various provisions denying a
deduction.

A.

Illegal Business Expenses Under Section 162(c)(2)
A basic principle

of determining the punishment for an offense is that

there should be a rational relationship between the severity of the punishment
and the seriousness of the offense. In the words of W.S. Gilbert in a lyric for
The Mikado, "let the punishment fit the crime."58 Other factors

the musical

(such as provocation or the wrongdoer's past behavior) can be taken into
account to mitigate or aggravate the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer. It

would be totally unacceptable to have the severity of punishment turn on

purely arbitrary factors. To take an extreme example, the public would be
aghast if legislation were to provide that the punishment for a crime depended
on whether it rained on the day that sentencing was pronounced. If it doesn't
rain that day, the sentence is five years imprisonment; if it rains once that day,
ten years; and if it rains twice that day, 1 5 years. Similarly, it would be
unacceptable to make the years of incarceration depend upon the length of the
wrongdoer's foot. It is, of course, unthinkable that such ridiculous standards
would ever be employed, and they would be invalidated if they were adopted.
Yet, while the punishment imposed by denying a deduction for illegal
expenses is not as obviously absurd as those examples, it is almost as arbitrary.
The amount of cost suffered for a denial of a deduction is the
additional amount of income tax that the taxpayer will incur. The amount of
that tax depends upon two factors: ( 1 ) the amount of the expense that is denied
a deduction, and (2) the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer at which the
additional taxable income will be taxed. Neither of those factors has any
bearing on the degree of culpability of the action taken by the taxpayer. The
size of the penalty imposed by denying a deduction is based on conditions no
more relevant to determining the seriousness of the crime than is the condition
of the weather on sentencing day or the size of the taxpayer's foot. The
following examples illustrate the arbitrariness of denying a deduction for
illegal expenses.

X

and Y each operates similar businesses. Each earns $400,000

in

gross receipts in Year One. Each has $300,000 of illegal expenses that would
be deductible in determining taxable income were it not for the denial of a
deduction by section 162(c)(2). The nature of the income that X and Y earned

58. W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO OR THE TOWN OF TITIPU 37 {London G.
Bell and Sons, Ltd. 1911).
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and the illegal expenses they incurred are essentially the same. Neither is more
culpable than the other. Both X and Y will report$300,000 more income than
they otherwise would have reported. At X's marginal tax rate, X pays a tax of
$75,000 on the additional $300,000 of income (an effective tax rate of 25
percent). Y, however, had net operating loss carryovers from prior years. 59 As
a consequence of that carryover loss deduction, Y pays a tax of only $3,000
on the additional $300,000 of income (an effective tax rate of 1 percent). X
and Y committed the same acts, earned the same amount of revenue from those
acts, and have identical degrees of culpability. Yet, the tax law, because of the
mechanical way in which it applies its penalty, punishes X with a penalty that
is 25 times greater than the penalty it imposes on Y.
The State ofErehwon has several horse racing businesses operating in
its jurisdiction. A small but vocal group of citizens of Erehwon oppose horse
racing and lobby for the state to ban it. To placate those citizens, the state
makes it illegal to pay rent for an establishment for the purpose of conducting
horse racing. The penalty for paying rent in contravention of the law is a fine
of$25, andErehwon does enforce that fine. Z operates a horse racing business
in Erehwon. Z rents the establishment at which the racing takes place at an
annual rental of$600,000. For Year One, Z has net winnings of$800,000, and
so Z has a net profit of $200,000 before paying the $25 fine to the state.
However, because her payment of the rent is illegal, Z cannot deduct the cost
of the rent and must pay income tax on her$800,000 of gross income. Let us
assume that that $800,000 is taxed at an effective rate of 30 percent for a tax
of$240,000. Consequently, after taxes, Z has suffered a $40,000 loss. Clearly,
Z cannot continue to conduct that business on that basis. The point is that while
the state considers the offense to be of a very minor nature and imposes a small
penalty, the federal government imposes a large penalty (effectively an
$180,000 fine) without any regard to whether the federal government
considers the offense to be a serious one or not.
M, a racketeer, pays$50,000 to an assassin to eliminate a competitor.
Let us assume that that is a customary expense in M's business. The tax law
punishes M by denying him a deduction for that payment, which otherwise
would be an ordinary business expense deduction. R operates an illegal
gambling business and pays rent of$600,000 per year for the premises. Under
state law, the payment of that rent is itself illegal. The tax law punishes R by
denying her a business expense deduction for the rent she paid. A comparison
of the purposes of the payments made by M and R shows that M's payment
was far more heinous. M made a payment to kill a human being. R merely paid
rent to operate an illegal gambling operation. Yet, the tax law punishes R far
more severely than M. R is denied a deduction of$600,000, and M is denied
a deduction of only$50,000.
59. Section 172 permits certain net losses (referred to as a net operating
loss) to be carried forward and deducted in subsequent years.
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The point of those examples is to show that the operation of the
penalty imposed by section 162(c)(2) has no relationship to the extent of how
evil or heinous the act of the taxpayer was. When a jurisdiction imposes a
penalty for an act, it makes a determination of how seriously it regards the
offense, how heinous the crime is, and the past history and condition of the
wrongdoer. By adopting section 162(c)(2), Congress has chosen to increase
the jurisdiction's penalty on purely mechanical criteria without any regard to
whether the additional penalty is warranted. Consider one more illustration:
G is a public official of the State of Erehwon. G is entrusted with the
task of choosing the contractor to build and repair roads in the state. L is a
contractor who puts in a bid to build and repair the state's roads. G tells L that
she will not receive the contract unless she gives G a bribe of $200,000. L's
business has had a downturn recently and if L fails to secure this contract, she
will have to liquidate. So, L pays G the bribe. The crime is discovered and
both G and L are convicted and punished. Both committed a crime and both
should be punished, and the state did so. But, not satisfied with whatever
punishment the state imposed and without regard to how severe that
punishment might have been, the federal government adds to the punishment
by denying L a deduction for the bribe she paid. Between G and L (and both
are culpable), it is obvious that G's acts are the more heinous. G violated a
public trust and G instigated the crime by soliciting the bribe. Yet, the
government adds a penalty to only one of the two, and the one it penalizes is
L, the less culpable of the two. G must include the bribe in his income, but that
is not a penalty. G's tax is the same as the tax paid by anyone who earns income
whether legally or not. The only one that is penalized is L because she is denied
a deduction for her payment. This result reflects the arbitrary manner in which
the penalty applies.
The government agencies enforcing the law prohibiting such bribes
often do not prosecute the payor either out of sympathy for the duress under
which she acted or in exchange for her testifying against the payee. 60 In such
cases, it is especially inappropriate for the tax law to punish the payor when
the state or federal agency that is charged with enforcing the law has chosen
not to punish her. This situation can arise in any case in which the enforcing
agency has granted immunity to a wrongdoer.
It should be noted that the impact of the penalty imposed by denying
a deduction is influenced by the amount of revenue that the illegal payment
produces. If the illegal payment produces a very large amount of revenue for
the taxpayer, the penalty will not prevent the transaction from producing a
large profit. On the other hand, if the illegal payment produces a relatively
small amount of revenue, the penalty could make the transaction a net loss. As
60. The payment by the payor would not be deductible because of section
162(c)( l ) which denies a deduction for a bribe paid to a government official that is
illegal regardless of whether the crime is generally enforced.
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162(c) does not take that

consideration into account.
While the authors' principal objection to section 162(c)(2) is its
arbitrary operation, there is another reason to object to that provision. When
someone is accused of a crime, the accused is provided with a number of
protections and rights that are not available in civil actions. By making the
punishment of an unlawful act an item of federal tax law, the issue will arise
in the context of civil tax litigation. In those cases, the taxpayer will be
deprived of some of the protection and rights that are available to criminal
defendants. For example, evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure,
whether obtained by a federal or a state agent, cannot be put into evidence in
61
a criminal trial against that defendant. However, evidence illegally obtained
62
If the
by a state agent can be put into evidence in a federal civil tax trial.
federal government wishes to add to the penalty imposed for a criminal act, it
should provide the safeguards that are available to persons accused of those
offenses.
Let us consider this issue from a different perspective. If the
government were to allow a deduction for an illegal expense of an unlawful
business, would that implicate the government in the illegal activity? Putting
it differently, is the government subsidizing the illegal payments by sharing
the cost? For example, ifM opens a business that offers to kill people for a fee,
M will incur both legal and illegal expenses in operating that business. The
cost of bullets and poison are legal expenses and can be deducted byM under
current law. The wages thatM pays to hired assassins to carry out the contracts
are illegal expenses and are not deductible under current law. If, instead, the
government were to allow M to deduct those wages, is it effectively paying a
part of that cost?
The answer is no. The government has decided to tax illegally earned
income. The Supreme Court upheld the taxation of illegal income in United
States v. Sullivan.63 While a subsequent Supreme Court decision held that,
unlike other illegally obtained funds, embezzled funds are not included in
64
the Supreme Court overturned that position in its 1961 decision in
income,

James v. United States.65 Subsequent to the James decision, all illegally
obtained income is taxable.

61. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (expanding the
exclusionary rule established under the Fourth Amendment to the states as well as the
federal government).
62. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (allowing evidence illegally
obtained by a state agent to be used in a civil tax case and expressly disagreeing with
the prior contrary holding of Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 (1972)).
63. 274 U.S. 259, 264 ( 1 927).
64. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 ( 1 946).
65. 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961).
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The justification for taxing illegal income is that those who earn
income illegally should share in bearing the costs of government to the same
extent as honest residents. There is no good reason to exempt criminals from
paying taxes. But, they are to be taxed on their profits, the same as everyone
else. They can only be taxed on their profits if their expenses are taken into
account. The deduction for business expenses is not a governmental subsidy.
It is an essential element of the measurement of the profits earned by a
business, whether it is a lawful or unlawful business, and whether the expense
itself is legal or not. In the example of M' s assassination business, the illegal
wages that M pays are no less an element of his profits than the legal expenses
of purchasing bullets and poison. Moreover, if the government is willing to
share in the spoils of an illegal business by taking a share of the income it
produces, it ill behooves it to be squeamish about sharing the costs of
conducting the business. In for a penny, in for a pound.
Business expenses and profit-oriented expenses are deductible only if

they are "ordinary and necessary. "66 The words "ordinary and necessary" are
terms of art used in the Code. One might question whether illegal expenses
should be denied on the ground that they are not ordinary and necessary as
required by sections 162(a) and 212 (the business expense deduction provision
and the provision for the deduction of profit oriented expenses).
The short answer to that question is that if an illegal expense is not
deductible because it is not ordinary and necessary, then there is no role for
section 162(c)(2) to play. There is no need to have a provision denying a
deduction for an item that already is not deductible. The only time that the
section 162( c)(2) denial of a deduction becomes relevant is when the expense
would otherwise be an allowable business expense. Moreover, it appears that
Congress believed that illegal expenses could be deductible (i.e. could be
ordinary and necessary) or it would not have enacted section 162(c).

An examination of the meaning and application of the term ordinary
and

necessary

shows

that

many

illegal

expenses

will

satisfy

those

requirements.
The word "ordinary" and the word "necessary" have each been given
its own meaning. The landmark Supreme Court case that first defined those
two terms is

Welch v. Helvering. 67 In that case, Justice Benjamin Cardozo

defined the term "ordinary" as meaning that the expense not be unique in the
experience of the group or community of which the taxpayer is a member.68
Despite that language, there are indications in the opinion that the Court
regarded the function of the word "ordinary" as merely serving to distinguish
capital expenditures from current expenses. Subsequent Supreme Court cases
have indicated that the word "ordinary" merely separates capital expenditures

66. See l.R.C. §§ 162(a), 2 1 2.
67. 290 U.S. 1 1 1 (1933).
68. Id. at 114.
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from current expenses.

69

In Tellier, the Court said, "The principal function of

the term ' ordinary' in [section] 1 62(a) is to clarify the distinction, often
difficult, between those expenses which are currently deductible and those that
70
are in the nature of capital expenditures."
While the broad language of the

Welch case suggests that the term

should require that the expense be a customary one,

71

there is no logical reason

why an unusual expense should be nondeductible. For example,

X, who is

engaged in a business, arrives at a completely novel concept for increasing
profits.

X expends funds to carry out that project which is successful. There is
X a deduction for those expenses merely because he was

no reason to deny

original and creative.
Moreover, in

Commissioner v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court allowed a

deduction to an illegal business (a bookmaker) for the rent he paid on his
bookmaking establishment even though state law made it illegal to pay that
72
The Court had to have deemed the payment to be ordinary and
rent.
73
necessary even though it was illegal.

In addition, illegal expenses are commonplace for illegal businesses
and therefore qualify as ordinary even under the narrowest construction of that
term. It would be strange to treat illegal expenses of an illegal business as
ordinary but to deny a deduction for the illegal expenses of a lawful business
on the ground that they are not commonplace to a lawful business.
The word "necessary" was defined by Justice Cardozo in the Welch
74
It has been so

case as meaning no more than "appropriate and helpful."
construed ever since that decision. For example in

Tellier, the Supreme Court

said, "Our decisions have consistently construed the term ' necessary' as
imposing only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and
75
helpful' for the development of the [taxpayer's] business." Also, note again
that the illegal payment of rent in the

Sullivan case was held to be deductible

and so was deemed helpful and appropriate.

76

One might question whether an illegal expenditure can be appropriate.
As to illegal expenses of an unlawful business, they would be appropriate to
the conduct of that business. As to the illegal expenses of a lawful business,

69. See, e.g. , Tellier, 383 U.S. at 689; Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. and
Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 , 353 ( 1971).
70. Id.
7 1. For an example of a case in which the court seized on that meaning to
reach a result it desired, see United Draperies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 936
(7th Cir. 1964), which disallowed a deduction for a lawful kickback).
72. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 28.
73. Sullivan was decided eleven years before Congress added section
162( c)(2) to the Code.
74. Welch, 290 U.S. at 113
75. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 690.
76. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 29.

Provisions Denying a Deduction for lllegal Expenses

201 6]

225

the minimal function accorded to that requirement makes it unlikely that it will
be applied to prevent the deduction of those expenses. It would be strange to
permit a deduction for the illegal expenses of an unlawful business but deny
them to a lawful business.
The government does seek to reduce purchases of certain items by
imposing so-called "sin taxes" on them. The excise taxes on tobacco and
alcohol are examples of sin taxes. Could the denial of a deduction for illegal
expenses be justified as a kind of sin tax to make that expenditure more costly?
Even if so characterized, it would be an arbitrary and inappropriate tax. Sin
taxes are applied to specified items at a specific rate. The denial of a deduction
for illegal expenses applies to any expenditure that is unlawful under federal
or state law without any consideration of whether the activity warrants
congressional attention. The governing body that made the activity illegal
established a sanction that it deemed appropriate to deter it. What justification
can there be for the federal government to add to that sanction without any
consideration as to whether any additional imposition is warranted?

The

arbitrariness of the imposition of the tax is exacerbated by the fact that the
amount of "tax" depends upon the income tax bracket of the taxpayer.

B.

Illegal Bribes and Kickbacks to Government Officials and Employees
Section 162(c)(1) denies a deduction for illegal bribes and kickbacks

made to a government official or employee. 77 The statute also denies a
deduction for a payment made to an official or employee of a foreign
government that is unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977. 78 This provision seems unnecessary since a deduction for such payments
would have been disallowed by section 162(c )(2) if section 1 62(c)(1) had not
been adopted.
The same objections to the denial of a deduction for illegal payments
(section 162(c)(2)) that are described in Part Ill.A. of this Article apply equally
to this provision. The denial of a deduction constitutes a penalty for an
unlawful act for which the j urisdiction involved has already designated a
punishment that it deems appropriate. The additional penalty imposed by the
denial of a deduction operates arbitrarily in that the amount of the sanction
depends upon the size of the payment and the marginal tax bracket of the
taxpayer. In addition, there is a failure to provide the taxpayer with the
protections and safeguards afforded to criminal defendants.
It is true that the government has an interest in the size of a bribe or
kickback paid to government officials since the size can influence the extent
to which the official or employee will cooperate. But it is not j ust the size of

77. -The provision also applies to an illegal bribe or kickback to an employee
or official of any agency or instrumentality of a government.
78. See supra note 9.

Florida Tax Review

226

[Vol. 18:5

the payment that determines the amount of the sanction and its significance. It
also depends upon the marginal rate of the taxpayer. Moreover, the influence
of the penalty on behavior depends upon both the size of the payment and the
ainount of revenue it produced. The denial of a deduction for a large payment
will have less effect on a taxpayer who earned a large amount of revenue from
the payment than it will have on one who earned much less. Consider the
following example:

K paid an illegal bribe of $ 100,000 to a government official. As a
consequence, K obtained a government contract that produced a net profit of
$3 ,000,000. T also paid a government official an illegal bribe of $100,000. As
a consequence, T obtained a government contract that produced a net profit of
$200,000. While section 162(c)(l ) denies the same amount of deduction to
each taxpayer, the penalty is not a deterrent for K to engage in the transaction
since K will earn so much more than the additional tax liability. On the other
hand, the denial of a deduction to T will have a substantial impact. There is no
reason to penalize T more severely than K merely because her venture was
less profitable.
Moreover, if the federal government wishes to penalize the payment
of bribes, the size of the bribe is not the only item that should be taken into
account. The entire circumstances surrounding the event and the past behavior
of the payor should influence the severity of the punishment. It is bad policy
_to focus exclusively on the size of the payment. Criminal law is better suited
to take those considerations into account than does the mechanical application
of the tax law.

C.

Kickbacks, Rebates, and Bribes Under Medicare and Medicaid
Section 162(c )(3) denies a deduction for kickbacks, rebates, and

bribes arising in connection with services performed under Medicare or
Medicaid. This provision applies regardless of whether the kickback, rebate,
or bribe is illegal. To the extent that this provision applies to illegal kickbacks,
rebates, or bribes, it is subject to the same obj ections that are described in Part
III.A.-B. to the denial of deductions to other illegal expenses. However, there
is more to be said in defense of the provision to the extent that it applies to
lawful payments.
The government has an economic interest in preventing such
payments because they will increase the cost of providing medical services for
which the government is charged. Nevertheless, the authors contend that the
provision is flawed and should be replaced. The denial of a deduction is too
mechanical a penalty. It fails to take into account any of the surrounding
circumstances that can make the act more or less culpable. If Congress wishes
to deter the payment of such kickbacks, rebates, or bribes, it should make them
illegal (to the extent not already done) and provide for a more nuanced
standard of punishment.

2016}
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Expenditures in Connection with the Illegal Sale ofDrugs
Section 280E denies a deduction for all expenses paid or incurred in

connection with the trade or business of trafficking in certain controlled
79
substances. This provision applies to all such expenses regardless of whether
they are legal under state law or not. So, anyone conducting a business of
marketing or producing a Schedule I controlled substance cannot deduct any
of the expenses of conducting that business.
This provision is the most objectionable of all of the ones discussed in
this Article. The denial of a deduction for even lawful business expenses
obviously is a penalty. Congress had made it unlawful to manufacture, create,
distribute, or dispense a controlled substance without complying with the
Controlled Substances Act. Congress can set whatever p enalty it deems
appropriate for violating that provision. There is no justification for having an
additional penalty imposed that has such an arbitrary structure.
One reason that section 280E is even more inappropriate than the other
provisions denying deductions is because the principal business to which this
provision applies is the marijuana business, since that is the only Schedule I
controlled substance that can be marketed legally under the law of a number
of states. There is considerable controversy over the proper characterization of
marijuana in America today, and there is ambivalence in the government' s
responses t o that controversy. The majority of Americans now live i n states
that have legalized the production and sale of marij uana at least for certain

purposes. 80 But the federal government continues to list marijuana as a
Schedule I controlled substance and make its manufacture or sale illegal.
Consequently, a marijuana business can operate legally for state law purposes
and yet be unlawful under federal law. This dichotomy makes for conflicting
rules which make it especially difficult for a business to navigate.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the federal
government itself has sent conflicting signals to the public. On the one hand,
the federal government makes it illegal to engage in the marijuana business
and adds the additional sanction of denying a deduction for all of its expenses.
On the other hand, the Department of Justice has officially announced that it
will not prosecute marijuana businesses if certain criteria are satisfied. 8 1 There

79. As used in the statute, controlled substance refers to drugs listed in
Schedules I and I I of the Controlled Substances Act. See supra note 40.
80. See BARCOTI, WEED THE PEOPLE, supra note 50, at 6.
81. In a series of memoranda, dated October 19, 2009, June 29, 2011,
August 29, 2013, February 14, 2014, and October 28, 2014, the Justice Department
announced that it would not enforce the CSA prohibition against marijuana in states
that decriminalized marijuana use, so long as the states do not allow marijuana use
that violates federal priorities. The memoranda list eight federal enforcement priorities
to guide the states: ( 1) preventing distribution of marijuana to minors, (2) preventing
revenue from sale of marijuana going to criminal enterprises, (3) preventing diversion
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is no indication as yet that the IRS will not deny deductions for the business
expenses of the businesses that satisfy those conditions.
The federal government needs to resolve this dilemma. It should either
leave the treatment of marijuana entirely to the determination of each state or
it should take the subject completely out of the hands of the state and resolve
it at the federal level. The current mixture of authorization and prohibition
rules is intolerable, demonstrating the inappropriateness of denying expenses
for a business whose illegality is under serious question.
A marijuana business that is operating lawfully under state law is put
in a terrible position by section 280E: it will be taxed on its gross income.
Unless it has low expenses, imposition of the additional tax could cause the
business to operate at a net loss; it cannot last long producing yearly losses.
Even if the business can break even or produce an after-tax profit, the burden
of complying with that penalty will reduce its capacity to serve its customers.82
Some members of Congress may be pleased to have the provision hamper
marijuana businesses, but it is such an indirect and confusing way to address

the problem that a better solution should be found. 83 To illustrate how

anomalous it is to single out the trafficking in drugs for this treatment, compare
it to the deductions permitted for other illegal activities.

X owns and operates a business which he calls Murder, Inc. To
conduct his business, he purchases bullets and poisons. Under the law of the
state in which

X resides, the purchase of those items is legal regardless of the
X is permitted to deduct
the cost of those items from his taxable income. Contrast the treatment of X

purpose to which the purchaser intends to use them.

of marijuana from states where it is legal to other states, (4) preventing marijuana
activity from being used as a cover for trafficking of illegal drugs, (5) preventing
violence and the use of firearms in marijuana activity, (6) preventing marijuana
impaired driving and other adverse public health consequences, (7) preventing
growing of marijuana on public lands, and (8) preventing marijuana possession and
use on federal property. As long as states have adequate measures to prevent these
eight outcomes, the Justice Department indicates that the federal government will not
interfere with state legalization of marijuana. Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative
Federalism, supra note 49, at 77-79, 86-90. See e.g. , U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of
the Deputy Attorney Gen., Memorandum for all United States Attorneys: Guidance
Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/30520 13829 132756857467.pdf.
82. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
83. It is a truism that overloading the voluntary self-assessment tax code
with non-tax related incentives interferes with taxpayer compliance. "We also see the
tax laws excessively used, again and again, to promote a wide variety of social and
economic objectives. The result: tax base erosion, shifting of the tax burden, added
complexities, and further fueling of taxpayer frustration." Simplification of the Tax
System: Hearing Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways & Means, US. H.R.,
108th Cong. 28 (2004) (statement of Mortimer M. Caplin, former U.S. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue Service).
·
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with the tax law's current treatment of
in a state where it is lawful to do so.

Y who operates a marijuana business
Y is denied a deduction for her lawful

expenses of paying rent for her premises and for the payment of wages to her
employees. While the authors view that it is proper to allow

X a deduction, it

is a bizarre system that allows X a deduction while denying Y one for expenses
of such an everyday aspect.
One consequence of section 280E is that the illegal drug business is
penalized by taxing it far more severely than other illegal activities are taxed,
in that all expenses are denied a deduction, not just illegal ones. Whatever
might be said for treating the illegal drug business as worse than other illegal
activities, and even that is questionable, it is inappropriate to include marijuana
in that category given the conflict in this country over the question of whether
marijuana should be lawful. This conflict of views exists in the public at large
and is reflected in the manner in which governments have dealt with the
subject. Almost half of the states have legalized the use of marijuana at least
for some purposes. The federal government itself reflects the conflicting views
of the harmfulness of marijuana in its treatment of the subject. While
continuing to list marijuana as a controlled substance whose manufacture and
distribution is illegal, the Department of Justice has stated that it will not
prosecute under that provision if certain criteria are satisfied. The conflict
among the rules concerning its legality and the ambivalence with which
governments have approached this problem, makes marijuana an especially
poor target for such harsh treatment by the tax law.

E.

Illegal Medical Expenses
As previously noted, 84 the cost of an illegal operation and the cost of

medicines or drugs obtained illegally are not deductible. The question of
whether that treatment is appropriate raises different issues than those that
apply to the other provisions discussed in this Article.
There are commentators who contend that the deduction for medical
expenses is a kind of subsidy in which the federal government is bearing part
of the cost. 85 If that view were correct, then it would be reasonable for the
government to declare that it will not subsidize and bear part of the cost for
illegal expenses. If accurate, the subsidy characterization would distinguish
the medical expense deduction from a deduction of a business expense which
does not entail a subsidy by the government.
To the contrary, there are commentators who contend that the medical
expense deduction is not a government subsidy, but rather can be justified as

84. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
85. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 309-3 1 0 ( 1 972) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Deductions] .
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an appropriate reduction for measuring disposable income.
we will not

examine

the competing arguments

86

Jn this Article,

for those conflicting

conclusions. However it is the view of the authors that the medical expense
deduction is not a subsidy. If it is not a subsidy, the question of whether illegal
medical expenses should be deductible turns on the view one has as to the
proper function of that deduction.
Even if the medical expense deduction is not a governmental subsidy,
it is not related to the production of income, and so the case for its deductibility
is more attenuated than is the case for business expenses. Consequently, there
is a stronger case for denying a deduction for illegal medical expenses than for
business expenses. Before turning to that question, it is useful to consider the
scope of the medical expense deduction and what that tells us about its
underlying principles.
The tax law does not establish standards for the type of treatment that
can qualify for a medical expense deduction. There is no requirement that the
treatment be provided by licensed medical practitioners. "The determination
of what is medical care depends not on the experience, qualifications, and title
of the person rendering the service, but on the nature of the services
87
rendered."
So, for example, the cost of attending sessions with a Christian
88
Science practitioner is a deductible medical expense.
The cost of attending
89
meetings of Alcohol Anonymous is deductible.
The cost of attending a
90
behavior modification program to cease smoking is deductible.
The cost of
attending a weight reduction program is deductible if the taxpayer needs to
91

lose weight because of an illness (and obesity is deemed to be an illness).

The expenses incurred b y members o f a Navajo tribe fo r "sings" performed by
Navajo medicine men to deal with a victim of cancer are deductible medical
92
expenses.
A fundamental underlying principle of the medical expense deduction
is that the decision as to the type of treatment a taxpayer will seek for his illness
is left entirely to the taxpayer. The government will not place any restraints or
conditions on that decision. The taxpayer need not choose the least expensive
treatment. The taxpayer can choose a treatment in a distant city so long as his
principal purpose in doing so is to obtain treatment for his illness as contrasted
86.

See e.g. ,

Andrews,

Personal Deductions, supra note 85, at 3 54-75;
Tax "Ideal " or Just Another "Deal "?, 2002

Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions-A
L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1 (2002).
87.

Brown v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 55 1 , 554 ( 1 974),

ajf'd per curiam,

5 2 3 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1 975).

80,399.

88.

Rev. Ru!. 5 5-26 1 , 1 955-1 C.B. 307.

89.

Rev. Ru!. 63-273, 1 963-2 C.B. 1 1 2.

90.

Rev. Ru!. 99-28, 1 999-1 C.B. 1 269.

91.

Rev. Rul. 2002- 1 9, 200 1 - 1 C.B. 779.

92.

Tso v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 277, 1 980 T.C.M. (RIA) �
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with a personal objective such as visiting a relative. The taxpayer can choose
a treatment that is not respected by the medical profession.
The authors believe that this deference to the choice of the taxpayer
should extend to illegal procedures. There are other sanctions available for
responding to unlawful expenditures. So long as the primary purpose of the
expenditure is to deal with a medical condition, the nature of the treatment or
its legality should be of no concern to the government.
Consider some examples. Martha suffers with cancer, and has been
told that modem medicine can do nothing for her and that she has only a few
months to live. Martha learns that there is an expensive drug that some claim
can cure her condition, but the federal government has determined that the
drug has no benefit and can cause harm. The federal government has made the
distribution or purchase of the drug illegal. In desperation, Martha purchases
the drug. Despite the illegality of the purchase, the authors have concluded that
it is desirable to allow Martha a deduction for the cost of trying to deal with
her illness.
Another example is the purchase of marijuana for medicinal purposes.
It is established that the use of marijuana can relieve symptoms of some
diseases. 93 A large number of states have legalized the production and use of
marijuana for that purpose. The IRS has ruled that the cost of purchasing
marijuana for medicinal purposes is not deductible even if purchased in a state
in which it is lawful and even though purchased pursuant to a doctor's
prescription.94 Given the division of authority between federal and state
governments, it is inappropriate for the federal government to counteract a
state policy on such a controversial issue.
The authors believe that in applying the medical expense deduction
provision, the federal government should not interfere with a patient's decision
as to what treatment will best deal with his illness. That has been a basic
principle of the manner in which the medical expense deduction has operated,
and the illegality of a treatment does not justify a departure from that principle.

93.

Despite the acceptance of the medical community as to some benefits

of medical m arijuana, the classification of marij uana as a Schedule
prohibits marij uana fo r any medical use.

See

HAWKEN, BEAU KILMER & MARK. A.

I

drug in the C S A

JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, ANGELA

R. KLEIMAN, MARDUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT
See also Penny Whiting et al,
Cannabinoids for Medical Use: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 3 1 3 J . AM.
MED. Ass ' N 2456-73 (20 1 5); Kevin P. Hill, Medical Marijuana for Treatment of
Chronic Pain and Other Medical and Psychiatric Problems: A Clinical Review, 3 1 3
EVERYBODY NEEDS To KNOW 94- 1 00 (20 1 2).

J . AM. MED. Ass'N 2474-83 (20 1 5) .
94.

Rev. Ru!. 97-9, 1 997- 1 C . B . 7 7 .

Florida Tax Review

232

F.

[Vol. 18:5

The Common Law Frustration ofPublic Policy Doctrine
As noted previously, the common law doctrine of denying a deduction

for expenditures or losses if the deduction would frustrate a sharply defined
public policy no longer applies to business expenses or to profit-oriented
95
expenses.
However, the IRS and the courts have continued to apply the
96
doctrine to losses, including business losses.
Before examining the question of whether the doctrine should be
applied to deny a deduction for business losses, let us first consider section
1 62( t), which denies a deduction for a fine or penalty paid to a government for
a violation of a law. A fine or penalty can be incurred in connection with a
business. Are there reasons why the arguments for allowing a deduction for
illegal business expenses should not apply to this provision as well? After all,
the payment of a fine or penalty is not illegal and so allowing a business
expense deduction seems even less obj ectionable.
To the contrary, there are

different considerations

at play in

determining whether a fine or pecuniary penalty that is incurred in connection
with a business should be deductible . A governmental body imposes a fine or
penalty as a sanction for a violation of a law. The size of the sanction is
designed to deter the prohibited behavior. The size of the penalty presumably
has been calibrated according to the methods of the criminal law, unlike the
mechanical nature of tax application. The concern over allowing a deduction
for a fine or penalty is that the resulting reduction of tax liability will reduce
97
the impact of the sanction and thereby interfere with its role as a deterrent.
This consideration puts the issue in an entirely different light from the question
of whether to allow a deduction for other business expenses. For that reason,
the authors consider the question of the appropriateness of section 1 62(t)
distinct from the issues discussed in this article and thus we have not addressed
that issue.
Let us now turn to the question of allowing a deduction for a business
loss when the loss arises in connection with the conduct of an illegal act. Take
9
the case of Holmes Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner discussed earlier. 8 The
president and sole shareholder of a corporation was caught transporting
marijuana in a car owned by the corporation. The automobile was forfeited to
the government. The corporation was denied a deduction for its loss of the
vehicle on the ground that the deductio� would frustrate public policy. The
corporation suffered the loss of a business item. It is an additional punishment
to the corporation to deny it a deduction for that loss. For reasons stated

95. See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
97. That concern was the basis of the Supreme Court ' s
Truck Rentals. See supra note 4.
98. See supra note 26.

decision

in Tank
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previously in connection with the denial of a deduction for illegal business
expenses, it is inappropriate to deny the deduction on public policy grounds.
The same reasons that lead us to conclude that illegal business
expenses should be deductible apply with equal force to business losses
incurred in connection with an illegal activity.
The public policy exception to deductibility has been applied in
nonbusiness areas. It has been applied to deny a deduction for a personal theft
loss where the theft occurred in connection with a counterfeiting scheme. 99
We are inclined to the view that the legality of the circumstances in which the
theft occurred should not obscure the fact that the taxpayer suffered a theft
loss. However, there are other considerations here. The question arises as to
the function of the theft loss deduction. If it is viewed as a government subsidy
of the victim' s loss, it is reasonable for the government to decline to subsidize
losses incurred in connection with illegal activity. If, on the contrary, the
deduction is viewed as a proper reflection of disposable income then one can
question whether the denial of the deduction is an additional penalty that is
subject to the same obj ections as discussed in connection with illegal business
expenses. Concededly, however, even if the theft loss deduction is not a
subsidy, a business expense deduction is far more integral to the measurement
of taxable income than the theft loss deduction and so the case for allowing
the latter is not as strong.
As to the proper characterization of the function of the theft loss
deduction, commentators have conflicting views. We will not engage in that
debate and instead leave that question open.
The public policy exception has been employed to deny a personal
casualty loss deduction when the casualty arose from an illegal act of the
taxpayer.

100

Once again, the view of the function of the casualty loss deduction

as either a government subsidy or not is relevant to the resolution of this issue,
and we will not address that question.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The denial of a deduction for illegal business expenses constitutes a
punishment that is applied on arbitrary standards and should be repealed.
Moreover, litigating a punitive provision in a civil tax proceeding denies to the
taxpayer some of the protections and rights granted to criminal defendants.
The denial of a deduction for lawful kickbacks, bribes, and rebates connected
with Medicare and Medicaid is less objectionable, but nevertheless should be
replaced by a more nuanced punishment. The denial of a deduction for all
business expenses, lawful or not, of a business trafficking in a controlled

See supra note 32.
1 00. See B lackman v. Commissioner,
published opinion, 867 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1 988).
99.

8 8 T.C.

677 ( 1 987), ajf'd without
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substance has no plausible merit whatsoever and should be repealed. This is
especially evident for marijuana businesses given decriminalization by many
states, at least partially accepted by the federal government, yet treated more
harshly than other strictly illegal enterprises. While the denial of a deduction
for illegal medical expenses is more defensible, it nevertheless is undesirable
in that it conflicts with the principle of permitting the taxpayer the option of
choosing whatever procedure the taxpayer prefers to deal with his illness.
Finally, the common law doctrine of denying a deduction for expenditures that
would frustrate public policy should not be applied to business losses. To
accomplish the obj ectives proposed in this Article, Congress would need to
repeal section 1 62(c) of the Code. In addition, because of the common law
doctrines denying a deduction for illegal expenses and losses, Congress would
need to enact a Code provision to the effect that a deduction for a loss or
expense that would otherwise be allowable shall not be denied on the grounds
that allowance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public
policy.

